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Well- Being  Measurement 
and Public Policy
Richard Layard
Chapter 1 of this volume represents an excellent use of time by its ﬁ  ve 
authors. It is a high point in an important program that has provided major 
insights into what people enjoy and do not enjoy in their daily lives. Equally 
important, intensive study of the experience of daily living provides an impor-
tant way of assessing the overall quality of an individual’s life. This method 
of overall assessment can provide a valuable addition to the answers to the 
global questions now routinely asked about life satisfaction and happiness.
My comments will focus mainly on this latter issue and will be concerned 
only with the ways in which well-  being data can best contribute to public 
policy debate. I shall begin by questioning whether the U-  index is the best 
way to represent the overall quality of a day lived. I shall then discuss how 
far data on enjoyment in diﬀerent activities can contribute to policy debate. 
Finally, I shall report on some parallel developments in Britain.
6.1      The U-  Index and Public Policy
6.1.1    Public  Policy  Usefulness
A major reason for much social science is to illuminate the public debate. 
It is not, of course, the only reason, but in the end much of social science 
gets used in policy debate. Given this, it is best to set up the inquiry so that 
its ﬁ  ndings are as explicitly helpful for policymaking as possible.
Among economists, the standard approach to public policy is to think 
of social welfare (W) as an additive aggregate of individual happiness, Hi, 
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perhaps with diminishing marginal social welfare attaching to increments 
of individual happiness:1
 W   
i
f(Hi)  (f  0, f  0),
where Hi is an empirically measurable value, but f( ) reﬂ  ects the ethical per-
spective of whoever uses these data in public debate. There are two extreme 










If we want to compare two situations, corresponding, for example, to two 
diﬀerent policies, we examine the sign of the change in welfare, given by:







Clearly this involves comparing the magnitude of the changes in happiness 
experienced by diﬀerent people.2 So, we must be able to measure happiness 
in a cardinal fashion, on an interval scale, where a change of one unit in hap-
piness means the same at diﬀerent points of the scale. And these units need 
to be comparable between people. To the economist who objects to these 
ideas, I would say that we all use these ideas regularly in how we describe 
the world:
Cardinality: we say A’s mood improved a lot today, but much less than it 
did yesterday.
Comparability: the bad news upset A much more than it upset B.
However, there is still the ethical issue about the function f( ). A strong 
egalitarian might say that we can ignore changes aﬀecting any but the least 
happy people, on the grounds that public policy mainly exists to protect the 
weak (its equity function). But this, of course, is quite wrong: much public 
policy exists to improve the eﬃciency of society, since externalities, informa-
tion problems, or economies of scale raise problems that require collective 
action for the beneﬁ  t of all. In fact, most policy actions involve equity and 
eﬃciency considerations simultaneously, which is why the perspective pro-
vided by equation (1) is important.
1. See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, part 2).
2. The exception is the Rawlsian case, where a purely ordinal measure of H will suﬃce if it is 
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6.1.2      Properties of the U-  Index
How well would changes in the U-  index provide a proxy for what is 
needed according to equation (1)? For egalitarians, one attraction might 
be the focus on the lower end of the happiness distribution (though not, of 
course, going as far as Rawls). But even over this part of the range, much 
information is discarded—we do not record how miserable an episode was, 
but only whether it was miserable or not. And again, if the experience was 
not miserable, we do not record how good it was, but simply that it was not 
miserable.
So, one might think that the most natural measure for each episode would 
be a scalar measure of how happy the person was. However, the authors 
claim that these aﬀect measures (as reported) are purely ordinal and vary 
between individuals, so they cannot readily be used in that way. However, 
they say that by comparing two of the measures, something can be learned. 
For example, let us take a simple example (simpler and perhaps more intui-
tive than the one they use). Suppose we compare the answers on the Happy 
scale and the Blue scale and set U equal to one iﬀ
Happy  Blue,
and otherwise zero. The argument is that if person A is more emotional in 
his reporting than person B, he will use higher values of both “Happy” and 
“Blue” to report the same state when compared with B. Thus, if we put the 
true ordinal measures on the horizontal axis and the reported measures on 
the vertical axis, we get the position shown in ﬁ  gure 6.1.
Fig. 6.1    Pattern assumed by authors148    Richard  Layard
Thus, any given state will lead to the same value of U, whether it is reported 
by A or B.
But the reporting pattern shown in ﬁ  gure 6.2 is just as likely. Here, A is 
more optimistic than B: he overreports “Happy” and underreports “Blue.” 
Now the two people may have diﬀerent U values for the same state. Indeed, 
the chapter has in table 1.3 an illustration of this opposite mechanism: when 
H is asked about before Pain (rather than the other way around), the mean 
of H is higher and of Pain is lower.
So, if all the aﬀect measures are truly ordinal, I do not see that the U pro-
cedure overcomes the problem. (Moreover, the procedure also requires that 
a person can compare on a scale of zero to six how “Happy” he is with how 
“Angry” he is. This is asking quite a lot. And how bad is extreme righteous 
anger if a person is at the same time quite high on the happiness scale?)
So, if the measures are truly ordinal, the procedure only partly handles 
the problem. Moreover, by comparing two numbers, it adds to problems 
of measurement error, while it loses so much of the information along the 
whole scale of H.
6.1.3      Is Happiness Purely Ordinal?
However, if we do want to use the whole scale, it cannot be purely ordinal 
in the sense that economists use the word—meaning that it can be arbitrarily 
subjected to any increasing monotonic transformation. Such a scale cannot 
be used to compare the magnitude of a change at one point of the scale with 
that at another. To do that we need a cardinal scale, which can be subjected 
only to an increasing linear transformation.
If we look at the ways in which people use the scales, they are surely not 
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perfectly cardinal nor perfectly comparable,3 but they do approximate to 
those conditions. The basic evidence, much of which is quoted in section 
1.3, is that if Hi is treated as a scalar variable and is regressed on possible 
causal factors, the size of many causal eﬀects is well determined. This is 
inconceivable with a purely ordinal scale that varies widely across indi-
viduals. Again, if we compare diﬀerent studies of diﬀerent populations, the 
eﬀect of diﬀerent experiences (like unemployment) is very similar across 
studies once we adjust for the length of the scale between “Very Happy” and 
“Very Unhappy.” It certainly looks as if respondents try to divide up that 
range into intervals reﬂ  ecting a standard diﬀerence in intensity.
This applies not only to estimates of the ﬁ  rst order eﬀect of a causal 
variable but also to some (second order) estimates of the curvature of an ef-
fect. An example of this is a recent study by Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell 
(2008b). The aim of the study was to see how quickly the marginal util-
ity of income falls as income rises—a key parameter for all public policy 
(including cost- beneﬁ  t analysis and optimal taxation). The six surveys used 
are shown in table 6.1 and cover ﬁ  fty countries and thirty-  three years. The 
happiness or life- satisfaction variable in each study was put through a linear 
transformation to ﬁ  t into a scale from zero to ten. All the analyses included 
(besides income) country  year dummies, as well as sex, age, education, 
marital status, and employment status. The estimated equation was







jxjit  yct  εit,
where i is individual, t is time, c is country, j is characteristic, and  is the 
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to real income.
Table 6.2 shows the estimated values of . The results of the very diﬀerent 
surveys are remarkably close, and they do not diﬀer signiﬁ  cantly between 
subgroups of the population. Since  is not so far from unity, the following 
logarithmic formulation is a reasonably accurate approximation:
(3)  Hit   log yit  
j
jxjit  yct  εit.
Table 6.2 shows the values of  obtained from the diﬀerent surveys. The 
estimates are less similar than for , but still remarkable, given the diversity 
of sources.
Clearly the ﬁ  nding about  is inﬂ  uenced by the assumption that people use 
the happiness scales in a truly cardinal way. This is not easy to check. We do 
ordered logit and probit analysis and obtain almost identical estimates of 
, but this procedure depends crucially on the assumption of symmetrical 
cardinal errors.
3. Moreover, if we are wanting an aggregate measure of happiness across a number of time 
periods (episodes), there are further requirements that the scale be a ratio scale (Kahneman, 
Wakker, and Sarin 1997). We have no evidence that people’s replies satisfy that requirement.150    Richard  Layard
The better approach is to ask what one would mean by a true interval 
scale of happiness. One might suppose that each unit on the scale should 
be proportional to a Just Noticeable Diﬀerence (JND). If this were the case 
and people were retested on their replies, people who scored low on the scale 
should have the same degree of diﬀerence between their two replies as do 
people high on the scale. In other words, a regression of test 2 values on test 
Table 6.1  Surveys used by Layard et al. (2008b)







United States 1972–2004 17,603 Happiness 









Europe 2002, 2004 26,687 Both (0–10) Monthly net
European Quality 
  of Life Survey
Europe 2003 8,175 Both (1–10) Monthly net
German Socio- 
 Economic  Panel




 Panel  Survey
  Britain   1996–2004  43,484   Life satisfaction 
 (1–7)
  Monthly net
Table 6.2  Parameter estimates for equations (1) and (2)
       
General Social Survey 1.20 (0.91–1.48) 0.70 (0.61–0.80)
World Values Survey 1.25 (1.05–1.45) 0.62 (0.57–0.66)
European Social Survey 1.34 (1.12–1.55) 0.60 (0.55–0.64)
European Quality of Life Survey 1.19 (0.87–1.52) 0.82 (0.73–0.91)
German Socio-  Economic Panel 1.26 (0.90–1.63) 0.55 (0.51–0.59)
British Household Panel Survey 1.30 (0.97–1.62) 0.35 (0.30–0.40)
Overall 1.26 (1.16–1.37)
Subgroups
  Men 1.22  (1.06–1.39)
  Women 1.26  (1.11–1.40)
  30–42 1.27  (1.12–1.42)
  43–55 1.26  (1.10–1.41)
  Low  education 1.13  (0.85–1.40)
  Mid  education 1.21  (1.01–1.42)
  High  education 1.26  (1.16–1.37)
  Couples 1.27  (1.11–1.43)
  Never  married 1.44  (1.13–1.77)
  Others   1.34 (1.12–1.55)   
Note: Ninety-  ﬁ  ve percent conﬁ  dence intervals in brackets.Well-Being Measurement and Public Policy    1 5 1
1 values should exhibit homoscedastic errors. In a test-  retest study of net 
aﬀect, Krueger and Schkade (2008) did not reject homoscedasticity.
6.2      The Role of Time Use
It is also extremely interesting to know how happy people are when they 
are doing diﬀerent things. It can aid reﬂ  ection on lifestyle, and it can help 
with public policy.
6.2.1    Work-  Life  Balance
But as Chapter 1 correctly says, there are no simple public policy conclu-
sions. For example, if people do not much enjoy their work, it does not follow 
that they should work less, since the marginal money they earn may justify 
the comparative disutility.
In discussing optimal work- life balance, the more important information 
would be about distortions aﬀecting choice: that is, about externality and 
misforecasting. If we can show that people’s happiness depends on relative 
income as well as on absolute income, then there is a negative externality. 
A number of studies have investigated the impact of other people’s income 
upon individual happiness,4 but the estimates are not yet precise enough to 
yield estimates of optimal tax. Similarly, there is evidence that people under-
predict the (negative) eﬀect of current consumption on future happiness 
(Loewenstein et al. 2000). Again, the parameter estimates are not yet well 
deﬁ  ned. But studies of these issues are at least as relevant for public policy 
as studies of time use are.
6.2.2    Explanatory  Power
But what about the explanatory power of time-  use patterns in explain-
ing the average happiness of diﬀerent people or groups? I had expected the 
explanatory power to be greater. For example, the U-  index is 2.8 points 
higher for Americans than for the French. But only one point of this is due 
to time use. Similarly, changing patterns of time use in the United States have 
predicted a one point fall in the U-  index since the 1960s. But did it happen? 
And how much do diﬀerences in time use explain the diﬀerences between 
individuals in the sample?
One fascinating aspect of the France and United States comparison 
(Rennes, France versus Columbus, Ohio) is that while the U- index is higher 
for Americans, so is average life satisfaction. But these apparent diﬀerences 
are readily reconciled once we look at the distribution of life satisfaction 
(see table 6.3).
So, to explain the life satisfaction results, it does not seem necessary to 
4. See Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2008a) and Layard (2005); see also Annex 2.5, available 
at  http:/ / cep.lse.ac.uk/ layard/ annex.pdf.152    Richard  Layard
invoke diﬀerences in reporting habits, since in both types of data, the United 
States has a bigger tail of unhappy people. It would, however, be interesting 
to see how this looked if we used not the U- index, but instead used numbers 
below a certain level of happiness.
As table 1.21 shows, the bigger U.S. tail of unhappy people is not mainly 
due to greater income inequality.5 It must be due to other aspects of inequal-
ity, perhaps more closely related to human relationships.
6.3    Britain
In Britain, it has become a matter of practical urgency to resolve these 
issues of measurement, because policymakers are demanding it. There are 
four main clients.
The Oﬃce of National Statistics has chosen well- being as one of the three 
main areas for statistical development over the next year. If successful, this 
would put measures of well-  being at the center of national government. 
Meanwhile, the central government department that has so far been respon-
sible for coordinating the Whitehall approach to well-  being is the Depart-
ment of the Environment (because opponents of gross domestic product 
[GDP] maximization are either promoters of well-  being or promoters of 
the environment). This year, the department included in its annual Indica-
tors of Sustainable Development the results of a well- being survey covering 
overall life satisfaction, domain satisfaction, “feelings experienced every day 
or most days in last two weeks,” social activity, physical activity, and cultural 
activity. The measures “are presented on a provisional basis and as a start-
ing point for possible future development.” A regular national survey of 
positive mental health will also be done by the Department of Health.
Finally, local governments are demanding ways of measuring well-  being 
locally—partly to monitor trends, and equally important, to identify where 
the real problems are in their communities.
All this reﬂ  ects, of course, the policy interest in well-  being. At least three 
departments have a policy- making section called “X and Well- Being,” where 
Table 6.3  Results reported in Krueger et al.
    United States (%)  France (%)
% not very satisﬁ  ed or not at all satisﬁ  ed 23.0 17.2
U- index  (average) 18.8 16.0
U-  index for bottom quartile   58.0   48.0
5. It is interesting that here, income does aﬀect feelings measured by the U-  index (see also 
table 6.1). This contrasts with the ﬁ  nding in Kahneman et al. (2006) for the Columbus sample, 
where feelings are measured by net aﬀect and are broadly unrelated to income.Well-Being Measurement and Public Policy    1 5 3
X includes health, work, or education. Major spending commitments have 
already resulted—for example, $600 million to provide evidence- based psy-
chological therapy in the National Health Service (NHS). Similarly, local 
government is responding to a statutory duty put on them to promote the 
well- being of their population. The interest is bipartisan, and Conservative 
leader David Cameron has proposed General National Well- Being (GNW) 
as an alternative national goal to the gross national product (GNP).
6.4    Conclusion
Let me list a few bald conclusions.
1.  Detailed measurement of aﬀect over the day provides excellent infor-
mation for monitoring well-  being and its distribution in the population. 
Both the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) and the Princeton Aﬀect and 
Time Survey (PATS) can play a great role. The team has performed a service 
to the world in developing these tools, and I hope the U.S. government will 
adopt one of them.
2.  The most useful analytical measures for each individual would be sca-
lar averages over the day, especially of happiness.
3.  The feeling that well-  being is fuzzy is similar to the feeling that once 
prevailed that depression is fuzzy. But clinical psychology has successfully 
developed scales (like the Beck Depression Inventory) that are no longer 
controversial. I have no doubt that the same can be achieved for well- being, 
even using scalar variables. If we worry about the measurement error in-
volved in single questions, we should bring in other closely related questions 
(as in the measurement of depression). Questions about anger and stress 
remain interesting but may not be near enough to the basic concept of well-
  being to be included in the scale.
4.  Determined and repetitive presentation of results from these scales will 
eventually result in popular understanding of the scales, just as people now 
understand Fahrenheit and Celsius.
5.  Congratulations on a fascinating study.
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